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Introduction
Brian Woodcock
The ability of modern medicine to maintain the human body by
artificial means has progressed dramatically. Even in the face
of complete failure of respiratory, cardiac, and renal systems,
artificial organ replacements can maintain life to a point beyond
that where any feasible recovery is possible. With artificial
ventilation, ventricular assist devices, and extracorporeal
membrane oxygenation, it can be extremely difficult to die in a
medical center with access to these advanced modalities of
life support. Problems can arise when the patient reaches a
point where technology is maintaining ‘life’ but there is no way
for life to continue without the technology. Withdrawal of this
support can raise more difficult questions than during
institution of support. The case we are presenting concerns
the dilemma of whether a patient would want to awaken before
life support is withdrawn and he/she is allowed to die. And in
this circumstance, who should make that decision?
The case
A 57-year-old patient suffered intraoperative complications and
failed to wean from cardiopulmonary bypass during a coronary
artery bypass graft operation. Inotropic drugs and intra-aortic
balloon counterpulsation failed to restore an adequate
circulation. The patient was transferred to the intensive care unit
(ICU) on multiple life support systems, including mechanical
ventilation, and left and right ventricular assist devices.
Cardiac transplantation is not possible for this patient for
logistical reasons. The biventricular assist devices cannot be
continued indefinitely. Placement of a permanent
implantable left ventricular assist device is not feasible. The
alternative is likely to be withdrawal of support, which will
result in rapid death.
In the ICU the patient is heavily sedated with propofol, but
otherwise presumably neurologically intact. Would you want
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Abstract
Intensivists have the potential to maintain vital signs almost indefinitely, but not necessarily the potential
to make moribund patients whole. Current ethical and legal mandates push patient autonomy to the
forefront of care plans. When patients are incapable of expressing their preferences, surrogates are
given proxy. It is unclear how these preferences extend to the very brink of inevitable death. Some say
that patients should have the opportunity and authority to direct their death spiral. Others say it would
be impossible for them to do so because an inevitable death spiral cannot be effectively palliated.
Humane principles dictate they be spared the unrelenting discomfort surrounding death. The present
case examines such a patient and the issues surrounding a unique end-of-life decision.
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to wake the patient up first so he could be informed what is
happening? Would you give him a chance to say goodbyes
to family? Should the intensivist ask the family to decide?
The feelings of the medical team are diverse, opinions vary as
to whether an individual would want to wake up before death.
Would it be cruel to wake him up, just to tell him that he is
going to die? He may have gone into the operation knowing
that this was a high-risk procedure but had the reassurance
of thinking ‘If I wake up, I’ll be OK, if I’m going to die, I’ll never
know about it’. In those circumstances the patient would not
be expecting to waken to the certainty of imminent death. An
alternative feeling in the medical team was that, given the
opportunity, many people would want to know what was
happening and possibly complete the process of saying
goodbye to loved ones.
A trouble shared is a trouble halved
Anna Batchelor
The case scenario presented involves three sets of people
each with needs and desires: the patient, the relatives, and
the carers.
Considering the patient first, he has no choice to make
about continuing care as there are no viable options;
however, he does have a right to know what is happening
and to make a choice about communicating with his family.
We are not told what his presurgery views were — would he
wish to be able to communicate in this situation or not? Is it
possible for this patient to have his pain, distress, and
anxiety relieved at the same time as withdrawing sedation to
allow a meaningful return of consciousness? The worst
endpoint would be a confused, agitated patient in pain
failing to effectively communicate.
The relatives are our concern too; they will leave the hospital
with memories of their loved one and the quality of care
offered them. Some people will be able to communicate
effectively their goodbyes and love to the patient, others will
find this stressful. We need to know from the family what the
patient is likely to have wanted in this situation. Had he
already said his goodbyes ‘just in case’ or had he avoided
such discussions? Is he going to be any better prepared for
such discussions surrounded by machinery and strangers? Is
he someone who liked to be in control of himself and his
surroundings and would welcome the opportunity?
The carers have to examine their own reactions and not
impose their own views on the family. Nurses particularly
being in close contact with the patient may feel strongly that
one course of action is preferable.
These matters should be resolved by team discussions
involving all the carers, and possibly a minister of religion if
that is relevant for the patient. Is it possible to achieve the
desired scenario of an awake, communicative, undistressed
patient? Would the patient want this? If so, who will care for
the patient during this episode.
Discussions with the family should involve a small number of
carers all saying the same thing. The relatives must clearly
understand that no further active medical treatment is
possible and that the patient will die. It is necessary to
explore with them the issues raised and find out whether they
feel the patient would wish to be awake, and whether they
wish this to be attempted. The family should feel that they are
involved in the decision-making process and asked for their
views but not that they are left to decide; yet again, this is a
team decision. Who will be present? Is this an opportunity for
the whole family to show they care or an intimate occasion
for one or two key people? This in itself can lead to conflict. It
should be clearly understood that the patient remains our
main focus and it may not be possible to achieve an awake,
comfortable patient. We will not allow him to be in pain or
distress, and treatment for this along with the presence of an
endotracheal tube will limit his ability to communicate.
No spiritual care without consent
Leslie Jenal
To wake this patient either to inform him of his impending
death or to provide an opportunity for closure violates classic
principles of medicine: nonmaleficence, autonomy, and
justice [1].
Under the facts of the case, this patient can no longer
exercise any meaningful consent as to his treatment because
nothing, in fact, can be done for him. Waking the patient to
inform him of his prognosis therefore cannot give him
autonomy in any meaningful sense. In fact, informing him of
his inexorable death is very probably an act of harm if he is
likely to suffer from death anxiety. Most people, even those
who have had a chance to prepare, suffer from death anxiety,
regardless of the depth of their religious faith and belief in an
afterlife [2,3]. Justice demands that our patient’s needs, and
only our patient’s needs, inform our actions. In this case, a
decision to wake the patient would possibly have more to do
with the physician projecting his own need to know the
cause of death onto the patient [4,5].
The decision whether to wake this patient for purposes of
closure concerns less his medical treatment than his
spirituality and, under the facts of this case, can have no
bearing on his physical health at all. Spirituality is defined
here according to its function as that which brings
significance and meaningfulness to a person’s life. The
principle of autonomy applies because meaningful consent is
required for spiritual care as for other types of treatment. The
patient cannot consent and probably no surrogate decision-
maker under an advance directive concerning his physical
health will have any power over spiritual care decisions. We
should not therefore provide spiritual care if we do not have a
reasonable belief that the patient would have consented [6].
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In this case, the presumption should be that we do not wake
the patient because we cannot guess whether he has a
spiritual task to complete.
Of course, the patient’s family may assist us in determining
what the patient would want, but the burden of proof is on
the family in this circumstance. The principle of justice
demands that we concern ourselves with the patient’s needs,
and not his family’s needs. First-degree relatives who have
been in close contact with the patient in recent weeks should
be consulted. We must be careful also to recognize that not
all families operate like our own families, like other families we
have observed, or like the families we would like to have.
Finally, we must consider procedural justice; that is, we must
decide with full knowledge of how we, as individuals, make
the decisions that we make. Decisions that impact a patient’s
spirituality require a very acute sense of the boundary
between the decision-maker’s needs and feelings, and the
patient’s needs and desires. Good decision-making requires
self-reflection, knowing ourselves, and knowing how we make
the decisions that we make.
My responsibility is to the patient not the
family
Farhad Kapadia
This example presents a dilemma one faces frequently in an
ICU. A sedated patient on multiple supports has reached the
point of no return. The family is informed and enquires
whether the patient can be aroused so that they may
communicate with the patient.
An encephalopathy is sometimes part of the multisystem
involvement. We can inform the family that withdrawing
sedation could lead to distress but there is little chance that
the patient will be lucid enough to communicate. This
invariably leads to a rapid family consensus that no such
attempt be made.
Another situation that is more difficult is one in which the
patient is likely to be completely lucid off sedation, but there
is a glimmer of hope that the illness may not be terminal. As
part of the intensive care therapy, sedation is stopped for a
few hours of the day and the level of consciousness
established. The family invariably communicates with the
patient in these brief periods.
The real problem occurs in situations similar to the patient
presented. First, it is presumed that the patient has no
chance of independent survival. Second, the patient will
probably be fully awake and comprehending when sedation
is stopped. Finally, the patient was probably not forewarned
that such a situation could arise.
In such a situation, to date, I have not agreed to stop
sedation. My reasons are as follows. First, my initial
responsibility is to the patient and not to the family. Also, I do
not know to what sort of distress withdrawal of support will
lead. I would not feel confident that I could offer reasonable
assurance that there would be minimal pain, minimal gagging,
minimal coughing, minimal bucking, and minimal respiratory
distress. Finally, even if I could assure an awake and
comfortable patient with judicious drug therapy, I would be
unwilling to decrease sedation as I have no idea what
thoughts would go through the patient’s mind. I would worry
that these thoughts may lead to severe mental distress and
perhaps even to terror of impending death.
I would explain these reasons to the family and inform them
that I am unwilling to stop sedation.
There are two settings in which it is conceivable that I would
agree to sedative withdrawal for terminal communication. First,
if there was some sort of prior documentation stating the
patient’s desire to communicate with his family terminally, even
in the environment of an ICU. Second, if I knew the patient and
family before the critical illness, either as their primary care
physician or socially, and I really believed that the patient would
have desired to communicate terminally with the family. To
date, I have not encountered either of these two settings.
First, do no harm
Stephen Streat
Does the patient have a ‘right’ to be awakened? One can only
speculate what the potential effects on the patient of such
awakening might be, but it is impossible to see this as being
anything other than ‘very bad news’. I am strongly of the view
that simply because the possibility of awakening exists, it does
not lead to the concept of a ‘right’ to experience it. On the
contrary, the patient has an overwhelming right to be treated
with compassion and dignity, and it is these considerations
that lead me to believe that allowing the patient to awaken
and be informed of the immediate prognosis is a bad thing.
Possible benefits to the patient such as revising a will are
small or absent. What about final farewells to loved ones?
Again, I believe that the well-informed patient will have taken
this opportunity after presentation of the risks of the planned
procedure. I believe that people tend to live their dying much
as they have lived their lives. If an opportunity to
communicate love and possible farewell was not embraced
and fully utilized when it was possible under optimal
circumstances, it is unlikely to be taken or be of great benefit
under conditions of considerable distress. There is also the
possibility that the patient might wish to participate in a
religious ceremony, or perhaps receive last rites. I am not
strongly persuaded by this view but could entertain the
possibility of discussing this aspect with the patient’s family
with a view to determining the strength and centrality of the
patient’s religious faith. It should also be mentioned that the
patient need not be awake to receive ‘last rites’ from most, if
not all, religions.
Available online http://ccforum.com/content/7/5/335
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The reality is that, after awakening, the patient will probably
have some postoperative pain and also experience the
discomfort produced by the presence of an endotracheal
tube. Communication is imperfect under these
circumstances, and this imperfection is often a source of
additional distress to intubated patients recovering from
critical illness, let alone a patient receiving a hopeless
prognosis. Perception of reality may be incomplete, like a bad
dream, and the patient may be frightened and unable to
respond with lucidity. It is difficult to imagine a patient being
grateful for such news, delivered under such circumstances;
indeed, I am inclined to view it as cruel.
We do well to realize that in everyday life we make choices
based not only on the possibility of benefit, but also on the
risk of unacceptably bad consequences — a circumstance
that Gillett [7] has eloquently described (in consideration of
the possible outcomes of severe brain injury) as “the risk of
unacceptable badness”. I argue that in this circumstance
(with the possible exception of the patient with unusually
strong religious faith, who might appreciate a final religious
rite), the risk of allowing the patient to awaken is
unacceptable in the light of the weak (or absent) arguments
for possible benefits that might accrue.
It is my considered opinion that this patient should not be
awakened during the dying process.
Wrap-up: some concluding thoughts
Leslie Whetstine
This case raises two questions: ought the healthcare team
awaken a terminally ill patient before life-sustaining treatment
is withdrawn, and who ought to make this decision? All of the
discussants agree on the substantive question, that this
patient should not be aroused. Some controversy exists
however, as to who should be the appropriate decision-
maker. The consensus is that this encumbered patient would
probably suffer unmanageable physical and emotional
distress upon arousal [8]. The discussants’ primary objective
is the patient’s comfort, and the burdens of arousal appear to
outweigh any projected benefit [9].
Kapadia and Streat fear that even if adequate pain
management were possible the psychological distress would
be inhumane, culminating in a nightmarish altered perception
of reality. Streat rejects the notion that simply because
arousal may be possible, the patient has a right to it. Jenal
argues that this is no longer a medical issue, but a spiritual
care decision that should not be imposed upon the patient in
the absence of a substantial consent. Jenal correctly points
out that the facts of the case leave no autonomy to exercise.
Batchelor, however, suggests that while there may be no
available medical options, the patient might have a right to
know what is happening and to make choices about familial
communication. In an ideal situation Batchelor is most
correct, but to respect autonomy in a literal sense would
actually require the team to awaken the patient to ask him
whether he wanted to be awakened. Clearly this type of
reductionism should be avoided.
As a practical matter, Batchelor favors a joint approach to
decision-making involving the medical team and family but is
clear that the patient’s comfort is her primary goal. Thus, if
arousal would cause discomfort, it appears she would not
comply. Streat does not suggest he would consult with the
family, while Kapadia would only awaken the patient if there
were advance directives or if he had an ongoing relationship
with the patient. Jenal endorses joint decision-making but
puts the burden of proof on the family, which seems to be the
appropriate standard in this case.
The principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence [10] are
clear for this patient. We have an obligation to do well and
prevent harm when possible. Given the clinical doubts that
arousal could be well palliated, the family must convince the
team that the benefits thereof outweigh the detriments. It
would seem unlikely that a family would be able to prove such
a case. In the event they could prove a convincing case, their
decision should be respected since the authority of surrogacy
is the established norm, at least in the United States. If not,
the physicians are ethically correct to tread the path leading to
the greatest patient comfort under the circumstances
The outcome of the case
Brian Woodcock
The outcome in this case was that the decision never had to
be made. The patient developed signs of a stroke, probably
due to embolus from thrombus in his left ventricle. Sedation
was discontinued and the patient had severe neurological
signs with absent brain stem reflexes. Support was
withdrawn and the patient never awoke.
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